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Attorney Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P Miller*
Study of two comprehensive class action case data sets covering 1993-2002
shows that the amount of client recovery is overwhelmingly the most impor-
tant determinant of the attorney fee award. Even in cases in which the
courts engage in the lodestar calculation (the product of reasonable hours
and a reasonable hourly rate), the client's recovery generally explains the
pattern of awards better than the lodestar. Thus, the time and expense of
a lodestar calculation may be wasteful. We also find no robust evidence that
either recoveries for plaintiffs or fees of their attorneys increased over time.
The mean fee award in common fund cases is well below the widely quoted
one-third figure, constituting 21.9 percent of the recovery across all cases
for a comprehensive data set of published cases. A scaling effect exists: fees
constitute a lower percent of the client's recovery as the client's recovery
increases. Fees are also correlated with risk: the presence of high risk is
associated with a higher fee, while low-risk cases generate lower fees. Fees
as a percent of class recovery were found to be higher in federal than state
court. The presence of "soft" relief (such as injunctive relief or coupons)
has no material effect on the fee, regardless of whether the soft relief was
included in the quantified benefit for the class used as the basis for com-
puting the attorney fee. The study also addresses costs and expenses. Like
fees, these display significant scale effects. The article proposes a simple
methodology by which courts can evaluate the reasonableness of fee
requests.
Of all the tasks facing trial court judges in class action litigation, one of the
most difficult is determining an appropriate fee. Even in settled cases, the
courts must determine that the fee is reasonable as part of their mandate to
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and William T. III Comfort Professor of Law, New York University Law School. Address corre-
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28 Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements
protect the interests of absent class members. Courts employ different
methodologies in performing this task. To date, however, they have rarely
looked to empirical research for guidance as to the reasonableness of the
fee. In part, the courts' failure to utilize empirical research is due to the rel-
ative paucity of available information. Existing empirical studies of attorney
fees in class action cases are limited in scope and generally do not control
for important variables.
This article provides a more comprehensive and analytically detailed
study of attorney fees in class action cases. It uses two new databases. First,
we compiled data on all state and federal class actions with reported fee deci-
sions between 1993 and 2002, inclusive, in which the fee and class recovery
could be determined with reasonable confidence. Second, we used infor-
mation on class actions reported in the March-April 2003 edition of Class
Action Reports (CAR), which contains more than 600 common fund cases
from 1993 to 2002.1 The data allow us to assess the determinants of
court-awarded attorney fees and expenses in class action and shareholders
derivative cases. The analysis should assist courts in evaluating requests by
class counsel for awards of attorney fees and expenses.
We find that the level of client recovery is by far the most important
determinant of the attorney fee amount. A scaling effect exists, with fees
constituting a lower percent of the client's recovery as the client's recovery
increases. The relation between fees and recovery is remarkably linear on a
log scale, and is similar between cases in which no fee-shifting statute applies
and cases in which the plaintiff had a right to seek reimbursement under a
fee-shifting statute. The presence of high risk is associated with a higher fee,
as is the presence of the case in federal rather than state court. Contrary to
popular belief, we find no robust evidence that either recoveries for plain-
tiffs or fees of their attorneys as a percentage of the class recovery increased
during the time period studied. Nor does the presence or absence of objec-
tors to settlement have a discernable effect on fees. The presence of a set-
tlement class-a class certified before the fee decision-is associated with
lower fees but the effect is not statistically significant. The presence of "soft"
relief (such as injunctive relief or coupons) has no material effect on the
fee.
The dominance of the client's recovery as a determinant of the fee
is nearly complete. Even in cases in which the courts engage in a lodestar
'StuartJ. Logan,Jack Moshman & Beverly C. Moore,Jr., Attorney Fee Awards in Common Fund
Class Actions, 24 Class Action Rep. 169 (2003).
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calculation (the product of reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate),
the client's recovery explains the pattern of awards better than (in non-
fee-shifting cases) or as about as well as (in fee-shifting cases) the lodestar
calculation. Indeed, the lodestar multiplier (fee award divided by the
product of reasonable hours and reasonable hourly rate) is significantly
negatively correlated with the percentage fee when only these two variables
are analyzed, and is not significant in the overall regression analysis. These
results cast doubt on whether the fees actually awarded by courts follow
the frequent case-law admonition that fees determined on the percen-
tage method should be checked for reasonableness against the lodestar
calculation.
The article is structured as follows: Part I describes the problem courts
face in assessing requests for fees and expenses and outlines the leading
methodologies used to rule on such requests. Part II surveys prior empiri-
cal studies on attorney fees in class action cases. Part III outlines hypotheses
about fees and describes the data. Part TV presents the results of our study.
We end with a brief conclusion.
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
All state and federal courts provide procedures for joinder of numerous
plaintiffs (or defendants) into a class action in which parties not before
the court are represented by a named plaintiff and by class counsel who,
in the usual case, dominates and controls the litigation.2 When a class
action settles (or when, in rare cases, it results in a judgment for the class
on the merits), class counsel is generally entitled to a fee award, either
under a fee-shifting statute3 or through application of the common fund
2The named plaintiff's minimal role is stressed in, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1987);Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role
in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991). Securities fraud litigation under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77,
78) may present a different situation. See Parts III.A.11 and IV.C.
'Fee-shifting statutes provide that, in designated cases, defendants must pay the reasonable
attorney fees of prevailing plaintiffs. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (fees in civil rights
eases).
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doctrine.' All states and the federal courts also provide procedures under
which a shareholder can, in appropriate circumstances, bring a derivative
lawsuit in the name of the corporation. Here, too, the shareholder's attor-
ney is generally entitled, if successful, to an award of fees under application
of the "common benefit" rule.
The amount of fees and expenses paid to class counsel must ultimately
be determined by the court. With respect to fee-shifting statutes and awards
of fees under the common benefit rule in derivative cases, the fees will be
paid by the defendant or by the corporation, neither of which have the
ability to control the reasonableness of class counsel's fee demands. Without
judicial supervision, counsel could make entirely unreasonable fee requests.
In the case of fees from a common fund, counsel's request for compensa-
tion creates a direct conflict of interest with the class. Because class members
are dispersed, disorganized, and typically have a relatively small stake in the
outcome of the litigation, the class cannot protect itself against an unrea-
sonable fee request. Again, court protection is required to prevent counsel
from enriching themselves at the expense of the class.
Moreover, all class and derivative actions present the specter that
counsel will "sell out" the class or the shareholders by agreeing to a low
recovery in exchange for a generous fee. In common fund cases, the inap-
propriate bargain can take the form of a below-par settlement for the class
coupled with a "clear sailing" agreement under which the defendant agrees
not to object to (or even to pay directly) fees and expenses up to a certain
amount. In fee-shifting and common benefit cases, similarly, the defendant
can agree to pay class counsel's fees and expenses in an excessive amount
coupled with inadequate relief for the class or the corporation. The risk of
collusion with the defendant also necessitates judicial control over fees in all
class action cases.
Determining proper fees and expenses, however, is problematic. As to
expenses, courts review statements provided by counsel to assure that the
items listed are properly compensable separately from the fee and to assess
whether the amounts requested are reasonable. As to fees, ordinarily a much
larger item than expenses, courts use different methodologies. At one time
the most common method was to consider multiple factors, including the
time and labor required, the customary fee, whether the fee is fixed or
4See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975) (describing history
and function of the doctrine that plaintiffs' attorneys in class cases may be awarded fees from
a common fund generated for the benefit of the class).
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contingent, the amount involved and the results obtained, the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys, awards in similar cases, the nature
and length of the professional relationship with the client, the time limita-
tions imposed by the client or the circumstances, the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions, the skill needed to perform the legal services, and
the "undesirability" of the case. 5
The multifactor approach has the benefit of appearing to cover most
of the important considerations. But, like most factor tests, it is difficult to
apply in a consistent and coherent fashion. Some factors appear to be sub-
jective, for example, the attorney's reputation or the undesirability of the
case. Others seem duplicative-the list includes both "the customary fee"
and "awards in similar cases." Further, the courts provide virtually no guid-
ance as to how to weigh these factors or how to assess their impact if they
cut in different directions. In practice, the multifactor approach approxi-
mates a discretionary grant of authority to the trial judge to set a reasonable
fee based on his or her overall judgment about the case.
More recently, many courts, without necessarily repudiating the multi-
factor approach, have adopted two methodologies for determining fees
that appear more objective and quantifiable: the lodestar and percentage
methods. Under the lodestar method, as noted above, courts multiply the
reasonable number of hours expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly
rate and then adjust the product for various factors.6 The lodestar method
has numerous flaws, however: courts cannot easily determine either the rea-
sonable hours or the reasonable hourly rate; there are few protections
against counsel exaggerating either or both; the calculation involves the
courts in time-consuming and mind-numbing bean counting and risks trans-
forming the fee determination into a collateral lawsuit; standards for deter-
mining any multiplier for the lodestar are unclear and potentially arbitrary;
and the method creates a perverse incentive to counsel to waste time in
order to run up the bill once a victory of some sort appears reasonably
certain.
The leading precedent outlining this multifactor approach is Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
6E.g., Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002). For discussion, and a critique of the lodestar
approach, see Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70
Texas L. Rev. 856 (1992); Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can't Get
There from Here, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1809 (2000).
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The percentage fee fares better along these dimensions. Under this
method, which resembles the contingency fee in individual tort cases, the
court multiplies the amount recovered on behalf of the class by a percent-
age factor. The percentage method is easy to calculate, does not involve the
court in fee audits, and does not create incentives to waste time. Although
generally preferable to the lodestar method in cases where it can be used,
the percentage method is also imperfect. In some cases (e.g., actions for
injunctive relief or cases involving nonpecuniary relief such as hard-to-value
coupons), the amount recovered may be difficult or impossible to quantify.
Determining the proper percentage may be difficult, especially when the
case is unusual in dimension (very large or very small) or especially difficult
or risky. The percentage method provides an incentive for counsel to settle
early in order to avoid expending low-return hours. And, unless adjusted for
risk, the percentage method tends to overcompensate counsel in easy cases
where the probability of recovery is high.
Perhaps in recognition that both the lodestar and percentage methods
imperfectly estimate a reasonable fee, some courts adopt a blended
approach that checks the percentage method for reasonableness against a
lodestar calculation. This mixed approach may have value in correcting
extreme cases in which the percentage approach alone would generate a
windfall for class counsel, but it too is imperfect. Usually, when courts discuss
a lodestar check, they do so with a view toward adjusting downward if the
percentage approach alone results in an excessive fee. Thus, while it may
correct for cases in which counsel would receive an exceptionally high
hourly rate under the percentage method alone, the lodestar check does not
usually adjust for cases in which counsel would receive an unusually low
hourly rate. Thus, it may result in counsel being undercompensated on an
aggregate basis. Further, because the lodestar check requires the lodestar
calculation, it does not eliminate the burden on courts, the perverse incen-
tive to run up hours, and the dangers of mini-trials.
Regardless of the methodology used, courts could benefit from review-
ing empirical evidence on the amounts awarded in analogous cases. Courts
in this setting engage in a process of appraisal, and any appraisal can prop-
erly take account of comparable transactions. In fact, courts frequently cite
prior court precedents in which fees have been awarded. But courts almost
never examine empirical research that could potentially provide more sys-
tematic and statistically controlled information about the determinants of
awards. The following section surveys the existing literature and situates the
current study against this backdrop.
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II. PRIOR STUDIES
Several prior empirical studies shed light on attorney fees. Herbert Kritzer's
work undermines myths about contingency fees in individual cases, includ-
ing beliefs that their use involves little risk and that "contingency fee lawyers
and their clients are routinely in conflict."7 Empirical analysis of adoption
of the British Rule on fee shifting, under which the losing litigant pays the
winner's fees, also promotes understanding of what might be achieved
through fee reform.'
A few studies examine attorney fees in the class action setting. Studies
by the National Economic Research Associates (NERA), an economic con-
sulting firm, trace fees in securities class actions over the years. The most
comprehensive NERA study, published in 1996, provides information on fee
awards in settled securities class actions between 1991 and 1996, including
mean and median awards of fees, and fees plus expenses as a percentage of
settlement and as a function of increasing settlement amount.9 The 1996
NERA study also breaks fee awards down by federal circuit, finding a remark-
able uniformity in such awards between roughly 30 to 33 percent of the set-
tlement amount. A 1999 update of the NERA study increases the sample size
to 733 cases, with similar empirical findings.'0
7Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 739,
741 (2002) [hereinafter Seven Dogged Myths]. See also Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and
Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 Tex. L. Rev.
1943, 1949-57 (2002); Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Fee Shifting: Lessons from
the Experience in Ontario, 47, Law & Contemp. Probs 125 (1984). For a classic treatment of
fees, see Kevin M. Clermont &John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 Cornell
L. Rev. 529 (1978).
'Susanne Di Pietro et al., AlaskaJudicial Council, Alaska's English Rule Attorney's Fee Shifting
in Civil Cases (1995); Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement: An
Empirical Approach, 71 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 189, 191 & n.5 (1989);James W. Hughes & Edward
A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evi-
dence, 38 J.L. & Econ. 225 (1995); Edward A. Snyder &James W. Hughes, The English Rule
for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6J.L. Econ. & Org. 345 (1990).
9Denise N. Martin, Vinita M.Juneja, Todd S. Foster & Frederick C. Dunbar, Recent Trends IV:
What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions? (NERA, Nov. 1996).
"
5Todd S. Foster, Denise N. Martin, Vinita M. Juneja & Frederick C. Dunbar, Trends in
Securities Litigation and the Impact of PSLRA (NERA, June 1999). NERA's most recent itera-
tion of the study does not provide information on fee or expense awards. Elaine Buckberg,
Todd S. Foster, Ronald I. Miller & Adam Werner, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Lit-
igation: Will Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides? (NERA, june 2003).
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A 1996 Federal Judicial Center study examines all class actions termi-
nated between July 1, 1992, and June 30, 1994, in four federal district
courts.1" This study reports mean and median fee awards of between 24 and
30 percent of the net monetary distribution to the class.
The March-April 2003 CAR provides information on 1,120 common
fund cases extending back to 1974.12 These data are discussed below.
Finally, WilliamJ. Lynk analyzed 332 securities cases reported in a 1990
edition of CAR 3 Lynk found that mean fees and costs were 26.2 percent of
the class recovery.
The present study differs from prior studies in several respects. Unlike
the NERA and Lynk studies, which focus on securities class actions, or the
Federal Judicial Center study, which examined class actions in four federal
district courts, this study examines a full range of class action cases in all
state and federal courts, using two independent data sets and comparing the
results of these separate studies as a cross-check. The present sample covers
1993 to 2000; the Lynk study ends in 1990. Further, unlike prior studies other
than Lynk's, the present study employs regression analysis to analyze the
simultaneous effect of several variables on fees. The factors include some
(such as risk) that have not previously been examined.
III. HYPOTHESES AND DATA DESCRIPTION
This part first describes the hypotheses we test and then describes the data
sets used to test them.
A. Hypotheses
We started with several hypotheses about the determinants of fees and
expenses in class action and shareholders' derivative cases and sought to
design a study that tests those hypotheses against the two data sets. The
factors that we believed shape fee awards are levels of client recovery,
attorney time and effort, the category of case (e.g., securities, civil rights,
"Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & RobertJ. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions
in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 4 (1996).
12Logan, et al., supra note 1.
3William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs' Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-
Action Litigation, 23J. Legal Stud. 185 (1994).
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antitrust), the legal regime regulating fees applicable to the case (percent-
age of recovery, lodestar, and the presence of a fee-shifting statute), the
riskiness of the case, the case's complexity, the presence of objectors to the
fee, whether the recovery includes "soft" value to clients (such as coupons),
whether a class was certified before the settlement, and whether the case was
decided in federal or state court.
1. Case Size: The One-Third Fee
Substantial empirical evidence indicates that a one-third fee is a common
benchmark in private contingency fee cases. 4 But evidence also suggests that
the one-third fee is not as dominant as is widely believed. t5 Some regard one-
third as a floor as well as a standard, with contingency fees often exceeding
this percentage. a6 Kritzer, however, found that ex post downward adjust-
ments from a one-third fee are also common.1 7 Taken as a whole, the evi-
dence suggests that one-third is the benchmark for privately negotiated
contingent fees, but that significant variation up and occasional variation
down exist as well.
Given this evidence, what fee levels should one expect to observe in
court-approved class action settlements? One factor that might push fee per-
centages down as compared with individual contingent fee arrangements is
"See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,
47 DePaul L. Rev. 267, 285 (1998) ("[o]ne-third is the 'standard' contingency fee figure"). The
one-third rule of thumb finds empirical support in James S. Kakalik, Patricia A. Ebener, William
L.F. Felstiner, Gus W. Haggstrom & Michael G. Shanley, Variation in Asbestos Litigation and
Compensation Expenses 84 tbl. 1 (RAND ICJ 1984).
5Kritzer's empirical study of contingency fees in Wisconsin found that only 53 percent of cases
in which the parties were free to specify a fee employed a one-third contingency fee. Kritzer,
supra note 14, at 285. Kritzer also notes that federal or state statutes dictate or limit fees in
several classes of cases, including Social Security disability cases, workers' compensation cases,
and medical malpractice cases. Id. See also Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 7, at 759.
6For example, Lester Brickman states: "Standard contingency fees are typically at least one-
third, forty and even fifty percent in cases settled before trial and often more than fifty percent
[of the net recovery] in cases which go to trial." Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contin-
gency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 247, 268 (1996). Kritzer's analysis
of RAND's data from its study of the federal Civil Justice Reform Act also reveals substantial
variation. In fixed percentage cases, the one-third fee again dominated, but there was more
evidence of cases involving higher.percentage fees, supporting Brickman's observation. Kritzer,
Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 7, at 760.
17Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 7, at 761.
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the larger size of class actions. The aggregate nature of class action cases
should lead to larger awards to the class, which could well translate into
lower percentage fee awards to attorneys as a result of economies of scale.
But other factors might tend to increase fee awards. Because aggregating
claims increases the litigation stakes, the parties can be expected to expend
more resources to litigate a class action than an individual case. These
increased expenditures mayjustify a higher fee. Class actions are also by their
nature more complex than individual actions. Among other matters, the
class certification question is added to the plaintiffs' attorneys' tasks. Inter-
nal class management, possible competition from other lawyers for class rep-
resentation, and coordination of legal teams in large cases could require
lawyer effort and expertise not required in the typical contingency fee cases.
Theory does not predict whether class action fees will be higher or lower
than the norm in individual litigation. As a working hypothesis, we predicted
that average fees are approximately the same as in nonclass cases-approxi-
mately one-third of the recovery.
We also hypothesized, however, that the one-third guide would not
hold constant across case types. For example, this percentage likely breaks
down for cases with substantial nonmonetary relief. Injunctive relief in civil
rights cases, for example, does not translate easily into a dollar amount on
which to base a fee. As nonmonetary relief increases, the fee as a percent of
dollars recovered should be expected to increase. Further, we predict that
the fee as a percentage of the class recovery will decrease as recovery
increases due to economy-of-scale effects.
2. Lodestar Effects
Two different lodestar questions are worth separating. First, given the pre-
dicted relation between client recovery and fee award, does the lodestar cal-
culation better explain fee awards than the client recovery? If the lodestar
does not do a better job than client recovery at predicting fees, its efficacy
could be challenged on efficiency grounds in light of the work that goes into
the lodestar calculation as well as the requirement that the lodestar method
imposes on counsel of keeping detailed time records. Second, does use of
the lodestar method raise or lower the fee award over the percentage
method at a given level of client recovery? There is virtually no inherent
limit on the fee based on the size of class recovery in lodestar cases: in theory
the only considerations are the reasonable hours and the reasonable hourly
rate. It is true that cases with larger recoveries will tend, other things equal,
to require greater attorney effort, so some correlation between case size and
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lodestar fee can be expected, and also true that the lodestar fee could be
below as well as above the percentage fee in a given case. But in the absence
of the built-in limitation of the percentage fee, counsel in lodestar cases have
an incentive to run up hours and to refuse settlement offers in order to con-
tinue earning fees. Thus we hypothesize that, other things equal, fees
in lodestar cases will be larger than fees in percentage cases of similar
magnitude.
3. Effort; Complexity
Some cases are more complex than others, either because the proof
required is technical or difficult to obtain, because the procedural context
or applicable legal rules are convoluted or unique, or because the dynam-
ics of litigation between the parties generates difficulties such as motions to
compel discovery, motions for protective orders, motions for sanctions, and
appellate proceedings such as petitions for writs of mandamus and appeals.
We hypothesize that the fee will increase with case complexity, and that this
effect will be observed even when we control for attorney hours and for ex
ante risk: that is, for any given level of expenditure of hours and any given
level of risk, courts are likely to award a higher fee if they observe that the
litigation is highly convoluted and complex.
The length of time a case has been pending (its age) is a reasonable,
though admittedly imperfect, proxy for complexity, especially needed when
no lodestar fee is reported. As a further indication of the effort needed in
a case, we include in our analysis whether the opinion is that of an appel-
late or trial court. Cases pressed through appeal introduce an additional
stage to the proceedings and can signal enhanced complexity. When attor-
ney hours are not reported, a case's age can also serve as a rough measure
of effort.
4. Risk
Plaintiffs' attorneys in class and derivative cases nearly always litigate the case
on a contingent basis: they will be responsible for all litigation costs, includ-
ing both the opportunity costs of their time and the expenses of the litiga-
tion, if the case fails.'" Because attorneys, like other economic actors, are
' The ethics rules of some states might be interpreted to make the representative plaintiff
ultimately liable for litigation expenses, but in practice named plaintiffs do not assume this
responsibility. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions: Ethical
Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22 Rev. of Litig. 557 (2003).
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expected to be risk averse, they demand compensation for the risk of
nonsuccess in cases they take. That fees are adjusted for risk is widely
accepted in the literature. 9 Courts often discuss risk when assessing fees in
class action settlements." Consistent with theory and practice, we expect that
risk increases fees: other things equal, as the ex ante risk of a case increases,
the percentage fee awarded will also increase.
5. Payment by Defendant
In some cases, by statute or settlement, the defendant will pay the fee in
addition to the agreed settlement amount. The influence of payment by the
defendant on fees is ambiguous. If the court accepts that the defendant's
fee payment is truly in addition to the client's recovery, the court may feel
less need to scrutinize the fee. The additional fee is not coming out of the
clients' pockets and less need exists for the court to protect the class. On
this view, the defendant paying the fee could lead to increased fees because
judicial scrutiny would be lower and because class counsel has a self-interest
in obtaining the largest possible fee. On the other hand, paying the fee
enhances the defendant's incentive to bargain vigorously over the fee in a
settled case or to present strong arguments to reduce the fee in a litigated
case. When the defendant truly separately negotiates the fee level, it has the
obvious incentive to keep the fee as low as possible. Under this view, defen-
dants' paying fees should be associated with lower fees to plaintiffs' counsel.
6. Objectors
Objections to fee awards could signal different things. The objectors' eco-
nomic calculus suggests that they should tend to find it worthwhile to object
in larger cases. Expending resources to undermine a class action settlement
signals that someone, objecting counsel or their clients, believes the stakes
large enough to voice concerns. They are more likely to so believe in larger
cases than in smaller cases, because the objector has a chance for receiving
9E.g., Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths, supra note 7, at 256, 265.
'E.g., High-risk cases: In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 886 F. Supp. 445
(E.D. Pa. 1995); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 142 (D.NJ. 1994); In re
Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552 (E.D. La. 1993). Low-risk cases: Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
150 F.2d 1011, 1017, 1018 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices
Litig., 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); Conley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 222 Bankr. Rep. 181,183-86
(D. Mass. 1998).
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a larger commission from the class counsel to drop the objection. Objector
presence could also signal that the award to counsel is too high. Objectors
presumably value having some prospect of succeeding in their objection.
They are more likely to succeed when a fee award they challenge is too high
relative to an objectively proper fee than when the fee award is too low. Thus
we hypothesize that the existence of an objector will correlate with lower
fees, other things equal, and also that objectors will tend to appear in larger
cases.
7. Interaction Between Lodestar Multiplier and Percentage
As noted above, many courts check the attorney fees determined by the per-
centage method against the lodestar award. The idea is that if the percent-
age fee grossly exceeds the lodestar amount, the attorney would be receiving
a windfall, and the courts should adjust the fee downward to a more rea-
sonable range. Courts may also use an informal lodestar check, even in
cases where the check is not explicitly conducted, by granting a higher fee
percentage in cases where they observe counsel expending unusually great
efforts in the case. We predict, therefore, that there will be a strong nega-
tive correlation between the lodestar multiplier (fee award divided by the
lodestar) and the percentage fee awarded, and that this interaction will hold
even when other factors are held constant.
8. Soft Relief
Some believe that class action settlements systematically constitute better
deals for the lawyers than for the clients. This fear is perhaps most often
present in cases in which clients' recoveries consist in large part of non-
monetary relief such as coupons for defendants' products.21 Conflicts of
interest between class clients and class counsel have led critics to question
counsels' loyalty and ability to achieve fair awards for class members.22 It is
21See Severin Borenstein, Settling for Coupons: Discount Contracts as Compensation and
Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J.L. & Econ. 379 (1996); Christopher R. Leslie, A
Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Liti-
gation, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 991 (2002); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class
Action Settlements, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 97 (1997), Martha Neil, New Route for Class
Actions, 89 A.B.A.J. 48 (2003); Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 810
(1996).
'ElliottJ. Weiss &John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2065 (1995).
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thus worth exploring the degree to which "soft" relief influences the amount
of fees awarded to counsel in cases where soft relief is significant.
Soft relief may influence fees in two ways. In some cases, the court
assigns a value to the soft relief and includes that value in the measure of
the class recovery against which a percentage fee is assessed. These are the
cases where class attorneys are often criticized for artificially inflating the
assessed value of the case by including questionable coupons or other
unwanted items in order to enhance their fees.23 Our hypothesis is that such
"included" soft relief will be negatively correlated with the fee percentage.
The idea is that the court will perceive that the soft relief does not have the
full economic value attributed to it, and accordingly will award a somewhat
lower fee percentage to protect the class against a potentially excessive fee;
or alternatively that counsel will pump up the assessed value of the class
recovery with soft relief, then provide comfort to the court approving the
fee by seeking a below-average percentage of the relief so obtained.
In other cases, the settlement includes items of soft relief that are not
explicitly valued by the court and included in the class recovery against
which fees are assessed under the percentage method. For example, the case
may include defendant's commitment to refrain from engaging in the chal-
lenged conduct, thus benefiting class members and others in the future. If
the court does not value this commitment, it will not be included in the
quantified relief obtained by the class and will not be explicitly accounted
for in the attorney fees. Our hypothesis is that "nonincluded" soft relief will
be positively correlated with the percentage fee. Courts, in this hypothesis,
will award a more generous fee because they want to account, at least
roughly, for the added value that counsel has provided to the class and others
by the nonincluded relief.
9. Federal Versus State Courts
We hypothesized that attorney fees as a percentage of the class recovery
would tend to be higher in state court class actions than in federal class
23E.g., Lloyd Milliken, Jr., Fixing the Broken Class Action Lawsuit System, 47 Res Gestae 19
(2003) (proposed federal legislation "provides additional consumer protections to prevent
egregious settlements that give lawyers millions of dollars while leaving the plaintiffs with
worthless coupons"); Kendra S. Langlois, Note, Putting the Plaintiff Class' Needs in the Lead:
Reforming Class Action Litigation by Extending the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 855 (2002). Professor Leslie proposed
that when coupon relief is awarded, counsel should also receive coupons as part of their fee.
Leslie, supra note 21. The Texas legislature recently adopted a variant of his proposal. 2003
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 204 (H.B. 4) (Vernon's).
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actions, for two reasons.24 One reason is the potential for "reverse auctions"
in state courts.15 The multidistrict litigation process often results in consoli-
dating overlapping federal court class actions in a single jurisdiction, with
the forum being chosen by a neutral panel of judges rather than the
litigants. Overlapping state court class actions, however, are not consolidated
in a single state.26 With multiple actions to choose from as a settlement
vehicle, defendants are potentially able to negotiate settlements that sell out
the class in exchange for a generous fee for class counsel. If such reverse
auctions occur, their effect might be observed in the form of a higher
average percentage fee. Because reverse auctions are more likely in state
court than in federal court class actions, we hypothesize a higher average
percentage fee in state court actions.
In addition, fees may be higher in state courts because counsel may be
able to file in remote jurisdictions with few judges and significant potential
home-court advantage." These attorneys likely select state courtjurisdictions
that they believe will be generous with fee awards.28
10. Settlement Classes
Some courts and commentators are suspicious of "settlement classes," in
which a case may be certified for settlement purposes even if it does not
4We initially assumed that state court class action recoveries are smaller than federal recover-
ies. In nonclass action litigation, federal cases tend to be larger than state cases. E.g., Theodore
Eisenberg, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with
Real World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1239, 1266 (2002). If the fee
percent decreases as recoveries increase, then the average fee percent observed in federal court
would tend to be lower than the percent observed in state courts. But our data reveal no sta-
tistically significant difference in the distributions of federal and state class action recoveries in
non-fee-shifting cases.
'On reverse auctions, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 Columbia L. Rev. 1343, 1350 (1995); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart"
and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377,
1389-91 (2000).
2 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 514 (1996).
17See Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1875 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 81 (1999) (evidencing concerns about class counsel
cherry-picking judges in state court class actions by filing in remote locations).
"
5Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1933 (2002) (suggesting relation between profes-
sional fees and forum in bankruptcy reorganizations).
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meet all the criteria for certification of a litigation class.29 In particular,
settlement classes do not need to satisfy the manageability requirement of
Rule 23(b) (3) because the proposal is that no trial will occur.30 One concern
about settlement classes is that they may be a vehicle for counsel to present
an inadequate or collusive settlement to the court. If this concern is justi-
fied, we might expect to observe higher-than-average fees being awarded in
such cases. On the other hand, the effect of settlement classes is ambiguous.
Because such settlements often occur early in the litigation at a time when
class counsel have not expended a large number of hours on the case,
counsel could obtain a very large hourly rate even while accepting an
average percentage of the recovery. Further, some courts have indicated that
they will exercise enhanced scrutiny over settlements presented in the set-
tlement class context.3l If courts do exercise effective enhanced scrutiny, this
might check the tendency of counsel to reward themselves with excessive
fees in the settlement class context.
11. Securities Versus Other Types of Litigation
The structure of settlements and fees may differ in securities litigation com-
pared to other class action litigation. The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 32 applies only to securities class actions. In such
actions, the PSLRA requires that the lead plaintiff choose the counsel for
the class, subject to court review.3 3 The choice for lead plaintiff is presump-
tively the member of the class who volunteers for the job and who has the
largest financial stake. 4 This presumption is rebuttable only by evidence that
such plaintiff "will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"
'For particularly virulent condemnation of one settlement class, see Susan P. Koniak & George
M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1051 (1996).
3OSee Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
"
1E.g., General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tanks Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d
Cir. 1995); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982).
3215 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (2000).
3115 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v) (2000).
'15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (I) (bb) (2000).
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or "is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of
adequately representing the class.
3 5
The PSLRA's requirements generate conflicting predictions with
respect to the expected level of fees in securities litigation. On the one hand,
the Act's assurance that a large-stakes plaintiff will control the choice of
counsel should promote selection of class counsel that is more accountable
to the class than class counsel selected by other methods. This greater client
control, if realized in practice, ought to reduce the fees in securities litiga-
tion because the client, not class counsel, would be in charge. On the other
hand, greater client control of securities litigation may lead to selection of
superior class counsel. When class counsel select themselves, counsel may
be skilled at obtaining securities cases but less skilled at prosecuting them.
When plaintiffs with a large financial stake select counsel, there may be an
increased tendency to shop for the highest-quality counsel rather than to
accept the counsel who happened to trigger the case filing. Greater counsel
quality may warrant a higher percentage fee award than in other categories
of cases.36 The time period encompassed by our data allow exploring effects
specific to securities litigation. The PSLRA does not apply to private actions
commenced before and pending on December 22, 1995. 3v Since our data
include cases commenced before and after the PSLRA's effective date, we
can observe whether the PSLRA materially changed the pattern of fee
awards in securities cases.
12. Expenses
We also started with certain hypotheses regarding costs and expenses of
litigation-those amounts often paid to reimburse counsel for funds
expended in the course of the litigation. Costs and expenses, as used here,
do not include the value of attorneys' time. We predict that costs and
expenses will be positively correlated with gross class recovery, age of case,
presence of an appeal, the lodestar amount, and the amount of the counsel
fee. We predict that costs and expenses will be negatively correlated with the
presence of a settlement class (because if the case settles prior to certifica-
'15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (II) (aa), (bb) (2000).
'There may be grounds to question this hypothesis, however, if the mix of class counsel is
roughly the same post-PSLRA as pre-PSLRA.
17private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 202 (1995).
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tion, counsel will not have to expend resources on proving manageability
and also will conserve on notice expenses).
B. Data and Coding Conventions
To test these hypotheses we assembled a comprehensive database of pub-
lished cases. We searched in the WESTLAWTM "AllCases" database using
the search "settlement & 'class action' & attorney! w/2 fee! & date(=
[1993-2002])." This search's results were checked against a search of the
LEXIST "Mega" database using the same search terms. We also compiled
lists of citations in the cases found by these search requests and included any
additional cases meeting the basic search criteria. We further checked the
list against the CCHTM Federal Securities and Trade Regulation Reporters.
Once cases had been identified by this method, we sometimes gathered
additional information about case characteristics from other sources, for
example, information on the Internet or docket entries in the U.S. Courts
PACER system. These searches yielded an initial list of 449 cases.
Two of the most important variables for our purposes are the fee and
the client recovery. The fee was ascertainable in 417 class action cases.3 8
Where expenses are identifiable, we separated them out and did not include
them in the fee. The client recovery was usually available from the opinion
and a usable amount was coded in 370 cases. If the court stated a range of
value, we used the midpoint. If there was no better estimate available but a
maximum recovery value could be ascertained, we used the maximum pos-
sible recovery. If the court estimated the relief at "over" a sum, the sum that
was the minimum was used. Where the settlement amount included post- or
prejudgment interest, we included that in the amount of the settlement.
To code the court's fee calculation method, we tracked whether the
court engaged in a lodestar calculation and, if so, the purity of the lodestar
approach. This generated three fee method categories: (1) percent method
cases in which no lodestar calculation exists, (2) cases in which a lodestar
calculation exists but as a check on the percent or in combination with the
percent, and (3) pure lodestar cases in which the lodestar method was the
exclusive method used. If the lodestar amount was not specified, but could
be estimated with reasonable accuracy, we included it. We used plaintiffs'
own estimates of their lodestar only when these estimates were not contested
by the court. We also noted when the lodestar amount could not be
'if the litigation had the characteristics of a class action, even if not certified, we included it.
This occurred only for certain employment discrimination cases.
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calculated from the opinion. Where there was a range reported for multi-
pliers, we used the midpoint.
For many other variables, coding was reasonably straightforward. The
presence of an objector to the settlement, whether the case was in federal
or state court, whether the defendant paid the fee, and whether soft relief
constituted part of the recovery were all reasonably ascertainable from the
opinions. We were often able to detect the presence of a settlement class by
statements in the judicial opinion. It is possible, however, that in some cases
the court may have approved a settlement involving a settlement class
without announcing this fact and without providing other indicia in the
opinion that the class had not previously been certified. Where nothing was
said or could be inferred about the presence of a settlement class, we coded
the case as a litigation class, keeping in mind the possibility that some of
these cases may in fact have been undetectable settlement classes and that
some degree of error is thus inevitable with respect to this variable.
In employment discrimination and civil rights cases, two prominent
categories of fee-shifting statute cases, the amount of the relief to the class,
as expected, often was difficult to quantify because a primary element of
relief in such cases was often injunctive. For civil rights cases involving only
injunctive relief, the cost to the defendant was used when this was available.
In some fee-shifting cases, the court awarded attorney fees but it was impos-
sible to estimate the amount of class damages. These fee and recovery coding
conventions led to usable values for the fee amount and the client recovery,
our two core variables, in 362 cases.
We coded the age of the case based on the opinion date and the date
of filing, as reported in the opinion. We were able to calculate the age for
350 of the 362 cases.
Risk was not discussed in each opinion. Therefore, coding it depends
on assuming that it was not prominent in cases in which courts did not
mention it. We divided the cases into three risk categories. If nothing was
said about risk or if the court's discussion suggested a normal degree of risk,
the case was coded as being medium risk. If the court affirmatively indicated
the existence of substantial risk, or if exceptional risk was evident from the
facts or procedural history of the case, we coded the case as having high
risk. If the court indicated or the facts otherwise indicated that the case was
very likely to generate a substantial recovery for the class at the time it was
brought, we coded the case as low risk.
One qualification about using published opinions is in order. This data
set looks only to opinions that, for whatever reason, were published in some
readily available form. The data set omits opinions that were not published.
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Obviously, therefore, we have not included the full universe of cases in our
data set. Although published opinions are not necessarily representative of
the universe of all cases, they can lead to important insights. Our quantita-
tive statements are, of course, estimates, but they represent substantially
more informed estimates than those made without comprehensive knowl-
edge of the opinions. In one important respect, opinions are representative:
for judges seeking to inform their fee decisions with knowledge of other
cases, published opinions are the prime source of data.3 9 Further, as dis-
cussed immediately below, we checked the results of the published opinion
data set against the results of the CAR data, which do include nonpublished
opinions (but are less representative than the published opinion data set in
other respects, e.g., by including only common fund cases).
CAR describes its data4" and we leave the detailed description to that
publication. The CAR data, updated in 2003 after an initial 1990 study,
include 1,120 common fund cases, of which 630 are in the period
1993-2002. The CAR data emphasize securities cases, which are likely
oversampled in relation to nonsecurities cases. 41 For the period 1993 to
2002, securities cases comprise 77 percent of the CAR cases compared to 39
percent of the published opinion data we assembled. The opinion data
contain 276 nonsecurities cases (before reduction for missing data) com-
pared to 147 nonsecurities cases in the CAR data. So the CAR editors gather
more securities cases than are available through standard legal research data-
bases. For nonsecurities cases, however, the CAR data do not contain all class
action cases that are available in standard research databases. In addition,
the CAR data exclude selected cases, including those in which class members
received coupons.42 Another difference is that the CAR data do not contain
certain variables, such as risk, that often are ascertainable in the published
opinion data.
39Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri LynnJohnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1151, 1195 (1991).
024 Class Action Rep. at 167-68, 194-97.
41To account for the possible imbalance in either or both data sets, we have run, but do not
report here, our principal regression models with weighting schemes designed to reflect the
overweighting of securities cases in the CAR data and the possible underweighting of securi-
ties cases in our data. No material change in our principal results emerged.
424 Class Action Rep. at 194.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Because fees so commonly represent a percent of the client's recovery, a
natural starting point for studying fees is describing client recovery levels.
For example, if client recoveries have increased over time, attorney fees
should also be expected to increase in absolute amount even if not as a
percent of the client recovery.
A. Client Recovery Levels
For the 370 cases for which we have client recovery data in the published
opinion database, the mean gross recovery was $100 million in inflation-
adjusted 2002 dollars, and the median gross recovery was $11.6 million.
Figure 1 shows the mean and median client gross recovery for the years 1993
through 2002 in inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars. To complement our data,
we report the mean and median recoveries from the CAR cases for this
period, which show a mean gross recovery of $35.4 million in inflation-
adjusted 2002 dollars and a median gross recovery of $7.6 million. The figure
suggests that the mean client recovery has not noticeably increased over the
last decade. A few large awards led to unusual peaks at over $200 million in
the mean for the reported opinion data in 1994 and 2000. But the time trend
in the mean is not noticeably upward over time.
The median recovery in our data shows more upward growth. But a
relatively high period from 1999 to 2002 ends with the median award at $15
million, below where it was in 1994 and about where it was in 1996. Also,
there is no statistically significant time trend in the median award. Even the
ad-hoc approach of basing a time-trend inquiry on the observed peak in
1999, and post-1999 recovery levels, yields no significant result. If one divides
recoveries into those received prior to 1999 and those received in 1999 and
later, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the median recovery is the same
for the two periods (p = 0.161). The CAR data show no upward movement
in the median recovery over time. Thus, neither the mean nor the median
recovery support popular and professional perception that recoveries in
large class action cases are ever-increasing.43
4 Cf. Ellen Kelleher, AIG Intensifies Efforts on Tort, Financial Times 16, 2003 WL 62023040
(Sept. 4, 2003) (referring to "a sudden rise in jury awards as well as increased risks of class
action and corporate governance issues"). But there is a sense in which perceptions about class
action recoveries are correct. The amounts plaintiffs recover in class action cases far exceed,
on average, recoveries in other cases, even those that reach trial. For example, the median
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Figure 1: Time trends in recoveries, 1993-2002.
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SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
B. Fee Awards
We first discuss fee-award levels separately in relation to four major influ-
ences: legal regime (fee shifting or not), case category, client recovery level,
and time. We then assess the influence of these and other factors in regres-
sion models.
award in state-court tried tort cases in 1996 was $31,000. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Bulletin No. NCJ-179769, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, at
6 (Aug. 2000). Comparing recoveries per plaintiff could be done using the number of class
members.
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Figure 2: Distribution of attorney fee awards, 1993-2002, by fee-shifting
status.
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SOURCE: Reported class action settlements with fee awards.
1. Legal Regime, Case Category, and Fee Method
Preliminary examination of fee awards shows substantial heterogeneity in
the fee award based on whether the case involved a fee-shifting statute.
Figure 2, which shows the distributions of fee-award percents, shows that the
two kinds of fee awards differ. Non-fee-shifting cases result in a relative
paucity of awards above 35 percent of the client recovery. Fee-shifting cases
have a much wider distribution of awards. Two factors explain this differ-
ence. First, because fees in common fund cases are often awarded under the
percentage-of-recovery method, the highest permissible percentage award
sets a ceiling. In fee-shifting cases, fees are usually calculated under the
lodestar method, which is not dependent in any formal sense on the amount
of class recovery.44 Thus one would expect a wider range of fees in fee-
'The lodestar method of computing fees has been the dominant method in federal statutory
fee-shifting cases since 1984. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801 (2002).
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shifting than in percentage cases.45 Second, recoveries tend to be lower in
fee-shifting cases than in percentage cases, thus justifying a higher fee as a
percent of the recovery in light of scale dis-economies.
Table 1 summarizes fees as a percent of recoveries by fee-shifting status
and case category for our published opinion data in Panel A and by case
category for the CAR data in Panel B.46 Panel A's "Total" row confirms the
substantial differences between fee-shifting and non-fee-shifting cases and
the greater dispersion of fees in fee-shifting cases shown in Figure 2. The
table also breaks down the case categories in which counsel fees are awarded
in class action and derivative cases. Securities law class actions tend to dom-
inate, comprising over 40 percent of the non-fee-shifting cases and 39
percent of all cases, and an even greater proportion of the CAR data. But
other categories, including antitrust and consumer cases, contribute a sub-
stantial number of cases. Securities cases also tend to have higher fee-award
percents, though not the highest. The median securities case fee percent is
25.0 percent in our data compared to 20.0 percent for nonsecurities, non-
fee-shifting cases, a highly statistically significant difference (p = 0.0002). We
defer trying to interpret this difference until controlling for other factors in
the regression models below. For now, it is worth noting that in non-fee-
shifting cases, the axiomatic one-third fee is inaccurate; a fee of 20 to 25
percent of the recovery better describes reality.
Descriptive statistics about the fee percent awarded, now broken down
by the court's method of computing fees, appear in Table 2. Consistent with
Table 1, Table 2 shows higher percentage awards in fee-shifting cases. It also
shows that the lodestar method differs in its effect depending on the degree
to which it dominates. In non-fee-shifting cases, the pure percent method
and the mixed method, in which both percent and lodestar play a role, yield
quite similar fee percents. This pattern holds for both the published opinion
data and for the CAR data, which do not differentiate between pure lodestar
45This is not a complete explanation: fees in some common fund cases are awarded on a pure
lodestar basis, which would not be subject to any theoretical percentage ceiling, while fees in
some fee-shifting cases are determined under the percentage method when counsel seeks an
award from the common fund rather than under the fee-shifting rule. The distinction holds
true, however, in the vast majority of cases.
4 We included in the category of "Consumer" cases brought under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. Products liability cases are included in the Tort category. Shareholder derivative
actions are included in the Corporate category.
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Table 1: Fee-Award Percent Summary by Legal Regime and Case Category
Non-Fee-Shifting Cases Fee-Shifting Cases
Category Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
A. Published Opinion Data, 1993-2002
Antitrust 21.4 23.3 9.9 36 - - - -
Civil rights 37.0 37.0 1.4 2 26.1 31.3 17.3 7
Consumer 16.2 13.0 10.6 52 55.2 51.8 20.2 18
Corporate 20.4 20.0 11.5 15 - - - -
Employment 25.3 23.4 9.6 7 37.5 31.8 21.7 16
ERISA/pension 22.0 24.0 7.8 7 24.4 16.2 26.4 15
Mass tort 18.3 18.7 7.0 7 - - - -
Securities 24.1 25.0 8.9 142 - - -
Tax refund 13.1 11.5 9.7 6 - - - -
Tort 17.9 19.6 9.2 10 - - - -
Other 24.8 27.5 8.1 19 22.5 23.0 20.4 3
Total 21.9 23.2 9.9 303 37.5 33.0 25.9 59
B. Class Action Reports Data (CAR), 1993-2002
Antitrust 26.8 28.4 7.1 31 - - - -
Consumer 24.3 25.0 8.5 48 - - - -
Civil rights 23.5 25.5 11.0 4 - - - -
Derivative 33.3 33.3 - 1 - - - -
Employment 25.5 25.7 7.6 17 - - - -
Environmental 30.5 30.5 7.8 2 - - - -
Government regulation 29.7 29.7 - 1 - - - -
Labor/wage/pension 22.9 26.4 10.6 30 - - - -
Mass tort 17.6 17.0 6.9 8 - - - -
Securities 27.9 30.0 7.4 483 - - - -
Taxpayer 3.5 3.5 - 1 - - - -
Utilities 20.3 20.3 1.7 2 - - - -
Social welfare/entitlements 16.9 16.9 4.4 2 - - - -
Total 27.0 30.0 7.9 630 - - - -
NOTE: Fee shifting and non-fee-shifting are the two legal regimes for the published opinion
data. The CAR data include only common fund cases. The first column identifies the case
categories, which differ between the two data sets.
SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
cases and mixed cases. But the more finely tuned coding in the published
opinion data indicate that the pure lodestar method tends to reduce the fee
percent. The pattern shifts in fee-shifting cases. Now the pure lodestar
method tends to increase awards compared to the other methods (which
may be employed in the settlement context). We again defer reaching con-
clusions until we control for other factors in the regression models.
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Table 2: Fee-Award Percent Summary by Fee Method and Legal Regime
Non-Fee-Shifting Cases Fee-Shifting Cases
Fee Method Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
A. Published Opinion Data, 1993-2002
Percent 22.3 24.0 9.9 197 26.7 30.0 14.1 17
Mixed percent/lodestar 22.9 25.0 9.0 68 24.3 23.0 10.8 9
Pure lodestar 17.2 16.5 10.5 38 46.6 50.1 28.4 33
B. Class Action Reports Data (CAR), 1993-2002
Percent 27.5 30.0 7.5 370 - - - -
Lodestar 26.3 29.6 8.4 260 - - - -
NOTE: Fee shifting and non-fee-shifting are the two legal regimes for the published opinion
data. The CAR data include only common fund cases and do not include a variable
distinguishing fee-shifting from non-fee-shifting cases. The first column identifies the fee
methods. The CAR data do not contain a separate "Mixed percent/lodestar" method category.
Their percent method cases are likely dominated by what we code as percent cases in the
opinion data. Panel A shows the numerical dominance of this category over the mixed cate-
gory in the published opinion data.
SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
2. Client Recovery Level and Fee Award
Figure 3 shows the strong correlation between the fee amount and the client
recovery. Each small circle represents a case's fee amount and client recov-
ery in the published opinion data.47 As the client recovery increases, so does
the fee. This is not in itself particularly noteworthy. The surprising feature
of the pattern is how tight the relation is. To the extent cases depart from
the pattern, they tend to do so by having low fee amounts. That is, the data
points most distant from the central pattern tend to lie below, not above,
the pattern.
In addition to the scatter plot of individual award-recovery points,
Figure 3 contains three lines. Each line represents the best-fitting regression
line for a set of data. The solid line represents the best-fitting regression line
for non-fee-shifting cases in our reported cases data. The line represented
by long dashes represents the best-fitting regression line for fee-shifting cases
in our reported cases data. The line represented by the short dashes repre-
sents the best-fitting regression line for the CAR data. These one-variable
regression models are impressive for all three data sets. The model explains
89 percent of the variance in non-fee-shifting reported cases and 90 percent
47A scatter plot of the CAR data looks virtually identical in pattern to Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Fee amount versus recovery, 1993-2002.
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SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
of the variance in fee-shifting reported cases.4" For the CAR data, the model
explains 94 percent of the variance. Also reasonably impressive is the simi-
larity of the fee-shifting and non-fee-shifting regression lines (slopes of 0.83
for non-fee-shifting cases and 0.74 for fee-shifting cases) and the CAR data
line (slope of 0.90). No obvious theoretical reason exists to predict this close
fit between the results in the fee-shifting and non-fee-shifting regimes.
The fact that fees across the two regimes (and the CAR data) vary so
similarly with recovery suggests that courts may be engaging in an intuitive
approach that awards fees in log-linear relation to class recovery regardless
of the formal methodology being used to calculate the fee.49
48Although the figure's lines are similar, they do differ at statistically significant levels. A Chow
test of whether the coefficient on the client recovery variable is the same in the two samples
yields p = 0.0049. The fee-shifting cases start with a higher intercept but then have a relatively
flatter slope than the non-fee-shifting cases.
49The different distributions of the fee percents in fee-shifting and non-fee-shifting cases shown
in Figure 2, and their similarity in relation to awards in Figure 3, raise the question of where
the Figure 2 differences arise. The differences are largest for the smaller client recoveries that
Legend
Fee award, reported cases
- Fitted values non-fee-shifting, reported cases
.. .- -Fitted values fee-shifting, reported cases
--------- Fitted values, CAR data
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Figure 4: Fee percent versus recovery, 1993-2002.
f
00 f f ff
00 fff
f ff *-. f f f
_n 'n nfn"n n, n n. -- n n
f n _ --a~ " -n - - -------.eq n n n ..
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Recovery (log(10))
Legend
f = fee-shifting reported case; n = non-fee-shifting reported case
Fitted values, non-fee-shifting, reported cases
... - -Fitted values, fee-shifting, reported cases
--------- Fitted values, CAR data
SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
The relation between the fee percent (in contrast to the fee amount)
and client recovery is also of interest. Figure 4 explores this relation. Like
Figure 3, the figure combines a scatter plot of individual reported opinion
cases with separate best-fitting regression lines for fee-shifting and non-fee-
shifting reported cases, and the CAR data. In addition, the figure separately
identifies fee-shifting reported cases, designated with an "f," and non-fee-
shifting reported cases, designated with an "n."
Two major points emerge from the figure. First, all three data sets
reveal a scale effect. As client recovery increases, the fee percent decreases.
The regression lines, which differ in slope and intercept (p < 0.0001), nev-
ertheless share a substantially negative correlation with the size of the client's
recovery. The simple regression models explain substantially less of the fee
percent than they did of the fee level. In non-fee-shifting cases, the model
are more common in fee-shifting cases, which generate the high percentage fees. If one limits
the fee-shifting cases to those with recoveries in excess of $2 million, the slope on the fee-
shifting regression line is 0.82, just about the same as the slope for the non-fee-shifting
reported cases.
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explains 25 percent of the variance, in fee-shifting cases, it explains 57
percent of the variance, and in the CAR data it explains 15 percent of the
variance." Second, fee-shifting cases dominate in the upper-left quadrant of
the figure-corresponding to low-recovery, high-fee percent cases. They are
scarce in the high-client-recovery range of cases.
3. Fee Percentage and Lodestar Multiplier
As noted above, judges frequently use the lodestar amount as a check for
reasonableness even when they set the fee by the percentage method. Courts
may be unwilling to award high percentage fees when doing so would result
in attorney compensation far exceeding the lodestar amount, and conversely
may be willing to award higher-than-normal percentage fees when the fee
calculated by the percentage method would fall significantly below the
lodestar. Thus, if the lodestar check is effective, we would expect to see a
strong negative correlation between the lodestar multiplier (fee award
divided by lodestar amount) and the fee as a percentage of the recovery.
Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of the relation between lodestar multi-
pliers and percentage fees in the reported opinion data set, as well as the
best-fitting regression lines. We limit these cases to those in which the mul-
tiplier is present and not equal to one. As can be seen, the prediction of a
negative correlation is confirmed. Using only the multiplier (log) to explain
the fee percent explains 10 percent of the variance in non-fee-shifting cases,
34 percent of the variance in fee-shifting cases, and 4 percent of the vari-
ance in the CAR data.
4. Time Trends for Fees
The hypothesis that attorney fees are increasing over time finds little support
in our data. Figure 6 shows the essential facts. Neither the mean nor the
median level of fee awards has increased over time, either for non-fee-
shifting, fee-shifting, or CAR cases-a result largely confirmed by the regres-
sions reported below. In one sense, this should come as no surprise. The fee
level is fundamentally linked to the client's recovery. Since client recoveries
have not increased over time, fee awards should not have been expected to
increase. In another sense the result is intriguing. No real-dollar increase in
the level of fee awards in major cases over the course of a decade is not
'Tbe simple regression models used here for pictorial purposes are not entirely appropriate,
given the skewed nature of the dependent variable. We report more appropriate models below.
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Figure 5: Fee percent versus multiplier, 1993-2002.
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SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
the sort of fact we are accustomed to hearing. Impressions of fees as ever-
increasing need greater empirical support than has been offered to date.
The figure does reveal an occasional peak, such as the one in the mean
non-fee-shifting awards in 2000. As one might expect, most of the spike is
the product of a few awards-in this case two very large fee awards, over
$200 million, on recoveries of about $3.6 billion and $700 million. But the
pattern of mean fee awards quickly returned to historical levels in 2001 and
2002. In fee-shifting cases, conclusions in any direction should be more ten-
tative. As Table 2 shows, the data include only about six awards per year, on
average, so both the mean and median are based on thin data. Indeed, we
exclude 1993 from the fee-shifting lines in the graph because only one
(high) award is in the database.
In the interest of complete reporting, we do find bits of evidence,
reported in Figure 7, suggesting that fee awards as a percentage of recovery
increased over time. Figure 7 shows a slight upward slope over time for the
median fee percent in fee-shifting cases and a similar upward trend for the
mean fee percent in non-fee-shifting cases. But the model of fee percent for
fee-shifting cases in Table 4 shows no such time effect. A median regression
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Figure 6: Class action attorney fee awards over time.
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SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
model for the fee-shifting cases also failed to detect an increasing time trend.
And the CAR data on fee percents, also reported in Figure 7, show no such
time trend.
5. Regression Models; Other Factors
We explore the relation to fee awards of the above and other factors in
regression models. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for each factor in
the published opinion data. Dollar amounts are in inflation-adjusted 2002
dollars. We then combine the factors discussed so far and the other variables
motivated by Part III's hypotheses to model the fee level and fee percent.
-
- - - - -
- -- - - - -
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Figure 7: Fee percents over time.
/
/ \-
I \ 1/
/ \/
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Median fee %, non-fee-shifting
-Median fee % CAR data
- - - -Median fee %, fee-shifting
0J
--- -- -
-- -- --- - -
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year of Settlement
Mean fee %, non-fee-shifting - - - -Mean fee %, fee-shifting
- Mean fee % CAR data
SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
Table 4 reports the results of models of the fee as a percent of client recov-
ery and of the fee amount itself. Given the differences in the award distri-
butions of fee-shifting and non-fee-shifting cases, we report separate models
for the two legal regimes, supplemented by models for the CAR data.
Client Recovery; Lodestar Regression analysis generates several interesting
results. The most salient observation, confirming Figure 3, is that the over-
whelming determinant of fee is the amount of the recovery for the class. In
all models with "Gross recovery" as an explanatory variable, this variable is
highly statistically significant in explaining either the fee amount or the fee
as a percent of the client's recovery.
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This is not a surprising result for common fund cases, given that fees
in many such cases are determined as a percent of the class recovery. Gross
recovery for the class is also highly significant, however, for fee-shifting cases,
notwithstanding the fact that, in theory at least, court-awarded fees in such
cases are not a function of the amount of class recovery. As Figure 3 shows,
log scales reveal a positive linear relationship between fees and recovery in
our data set of decided cases for both common fund and fee-shifting cases,
as well as for the CAR data.
Focusing on a subset of the data-those cases with a computable
lodestar amount reported-suggests that, in comparison to the client recov-
ery, the lodestar fares poorly as a cost-effective way of calculating the fee,
especially in non-fee-shifting cases. This conclusion emerges from compar-
ing the second and third models for each of the three data sets-Models 2
and 3, 6 and 7, and 10 and 11. These models, by necessity, are limited to the
subset of cases in which a lodestar award can be calculated 5' because we
cannot test the lodestar calculation without information to compute the
lodestar. We compare the ability of the client recovery variable to explain
the fee with the ability of the lodestar calculation variable to explain the fee.
Consider first Models 2 and 3, those for non-fee-shifting cases. Table 3
shows that the lodestar-based Model 2 explains 87 percent of the variance
in the fee award whereas the client-recovery-based Model 3 explains 91
percent of the variance. The client recovery model also has a lower root
mean squared error. On both grounds it is preferable to the lodestar model.
Yet it requires less effort to produce a client-recovery-based fee than a
lodestar fee since the lodestar requires judicial scrutiny of hours and deter-
mination of hourly rates. The pattern is similar in the subset of the CAR data
that allows computation of the lodestar. The client recovery Model 11
explains more variance with lower error than the lodestar Model 10. Only
in the fee-shifting case data does the lodestar enjoy an advantage, but the
advantage in both the percent of variance explained and the error seems
trivial compared to the cost of computing the lodestar. And in the models
that use fee percent as the dependent variable, client recovery models
far outperform lodestar models. So whatever minor difference in fee the
lodestar may yield in fee-shifting cases, it is hard to justify its time and
expense in non-fee-shifting cases.
5 For the CAR data, the lodestar amount is calculated by multiplying the hours awarded times
the lodestar hourly rate.
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In the models of fee percent, Models 4, 8, and 12, the negative, sig-
nificant coefficient on gross recovery 2 is worth highlighting. This scale
effect-fee percent decreases as client recovery increases-provides empir-
ical support for the normative justification underlying class actions. By aggre-
gating smaller claims into a single larger action, economies of scale in legal
services are achieved, which can be passed onto class members in the form
of enhanced recoveries. Reform efforts that might undermine class actions
should consider this efficiency.
The results for the lodestar dummy variable confirm the story
suggested by Table 2. The lodestar method is associated with lower fees in
non-fee-shifting cases and with higher fees in fee-shifting cases. The size
of the coefficient is similar in the non-fee-shifting opinion models and the
CAR data models. It is likely more significant in the CAR data because of that
sample's larger number of cases. In addition, when we refine the samples
down to a more common set of cases-securities cases in Table 5-the
lodestar dummy variable behaves similarly in our data and in the CAR data.
At the same time, in models not reported here, we found no signifi-
cance in the lodestar multiplier as an explanatory variable when added to
the client-recovery-based model. We added this variable to Models 1, 4, 5, 8,
9, and 12, and one cannot reject the hypothesis that its coefficient is zero.53
This is despite frequent judicial statements that the lodestar should be used
to check the reasonableness of the fee awarded by the percentage method.
The principal determinant of the fees awarded in class actions is the size of
the class recovery, not the lodestar or lodestar multiplier.
Complexity. We expected a case's age to serve as a proxy for case
complexity or attorney effort. In either case, it should be associated with
increased fee awards. Table 3 presents mixed evidence about this hypothe-
sis. Most of the nine models that use the client recovery as explanatory
5 We constructed the same models using net recovery rather than gross recovery as the key
explanatory variable. No material change in results was observed.
531n models that limit the sample to cases reporting a lodestar and a multiplier, and that use
the lodestar as an explanatory variable, the multiplier is significant. But these cases are in fact
calculating the award by multiplying the lodestar. Since the multiplier is an after-the-fact adjust-
ment to settle on a fee, the explanatory power of models using the lodestar and multiplier in
lodestar cases is tautologous. These models have R' in excess of 0.99. Our question is whether
one can explain the fee award without use of the after-the-fact multiplier.
In general, due to the smaller number of fee-shifting cases, results for these cases should be
regarded as more tentative than results for non-fee-shifting cases.
HeinOnline -- 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 64 2004
Eisenberg and Miller 65
variables show a significant association between case age and both fee
amount and fee percent. But the association is positive in the non-fee-
shifting and CAR common fund cases and negative in the fee-shifting cases.
The non-fee-shifting and CAR results square well with intuition. The
fee-shifting result, even though only marginally significant, is somewhat mys-
terious, indicating that courts award lower fees in fee-shifting cases as the
cases age. One possible explanation is that older fee-shifting cases may tend
to be larger cases that cannot be settled quickly. If so, the client recovery
effect may swamp the expected increase in the lodestar fee award due to the
greater number of hours required of counsel as cases age. In fact, age and
client recovery are substantially correlated in fee-shifting cases (rho = 0.481;
p = 0.0001) but not in non-fee-shifting cases (rho = 0.064; p = 0.270). The
coefficient for the age variable is positive if one omits client recovery from
the model.
The non-fee-shifting and CAR models, Models 2 and 9, that use the
lodestar as an explanatory variable also require explanation because the age
variable changes sign and is significantly negatively related to the fee recov-
ery. This may be because the lodestar fee is based on hours and already cap-
tures the time component of the case. If, as is likely, hours increase with case
age, the lodestar amount should be more highly correlated with age than
the client recovery. This turns out to be true, to a modest extent. The cor-
relation between lodestar amount and age (rho = 0.272; p = 0.0002) in non-
fee-shifting cases is stronger than the correlation between client recovery
and age (rho = 0.064; p = 0.270). This stronger relation between lodestar
amount and age persists in the CAR data (rho = 0.363; p < 0.0001). The coef-
ficient for the age variable is positive if one omits the lodestar amount from
the model.
Another proxy for complexity is the presence of an appellate opinion.
This was not significant in the published opinion data set for non-fee-
shifting cases, but was significant for fee-shifting cases. It is difficult to
interpret why the results vary between these two.
Risk. Risk influences fee awards in the expected manner. When courts
mention risk in a way that we interpret as reflecting high risk, or when we
could otherwise confidently code risk as high, there is a significant associa-
tion with both the fee level and the fee percent. The sign on the high-risk
variable coefficient is uniformly positive. Cases we interpret as being low risk,
on the other hand, are associated with lower fees. The low-risk variable coef-
ficient is always negative in both fee-shifting and non-fee-shifting cases. The
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significance of the risk effects varies in non-fee-shifting and fee-shifting cases.
In all non-fee-shifting models, a test of the hypothesis that the high- and
low-risk variable coefficients are equal can be rejected at or beyond the 0.03
level. In the fee-shifting cases, the magnitude of the high-risk case effect is
larger, as evidenced by the larger coefficients, but the test of the hypothesis
that the two risk variables have equal coefficients can be rejected only at the
0.10 to 0.16 levels, depending on the particular model. The smaller fee-
shifting sample may explain the less significant results.54
Defendant Pays. In non-fee-shifting cases, payment by defendant is associated
with lower fee levels and percents, except in the seemingly inferior model
using the lodestar as an explanatory variable. This result is consistent with
the view that defendants exercise care to keep the fee low when they are
paying it in addition to the client recovery. The absence of an effect in fee-
shifting cases may be due to the fact that the defendant pays the fee in a
substantial majority of fee-shifting cases.
Objectors. With the exception of one model, we cannot reject the hypothe-
sis of no significant relation between the presence of an objector and the
fee award. To alleviate the concern that the presence of an objector is not
exogenous, we explored a simultaneous equation model in which the exis-
tence of an objection is modeled along with the fee award. The objection
model included the fee award as an explanatory variable. Higher client
recoveries and fee awards are significantly associated with the presence of
an objector. For example, the median recovery in a case with an objector is
$35 million; the median recovery in a case without an objector is $6.7
million. But the core objector-related result in Table 4 survived. We could
not reject the hypothesis of no change in fee award in the presence of an
objector.
This high-risk result should be reconciled with Table 3's descriptive statistics. The table indi-
cates that, in fee-shifting cases, high risk is present in 16 percent of 59 cases. The presence of
high risk is significantly associated with a lower fee percent, an initially strange result. The mean
fee percent is 27.9 in high-risk cases compared to 39.4 in other cases. But this is an artifact of
high-risk cases tending to have greater stakes. As the stakes increase, the scaling effect kicks in
and drives the fee percent down. The median inflation-adjusted gross recovery in high-risk, fee-
shifting cases is $4.6 million compared to a median of $492,000 in non-high-risk cases. As Table
4 shows, once one controls for size of recovery, high risk is associated with a higher percent
fee, even in fee-shifting cases. A risk variable is not available in the CAR data.
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Settlement Classes. We could not reject the null hypothesis as to the presence
of a settlement class in non-fee-shifting cases. This result casts some doubt
on the common perception that settlement classes are suspect because they
can be vehicles for collusion between defendant and class counsel. It remains
possible, however, that counsel do receive above-normal returns for their
efforts in settlement classes because such classes tend to settle early and
therefore may represent above-average hourly remuneration for counsel
even if the fee as a percentage of the recovery is within ordinary limits. But
the Table 4 models using the lodestar as explanatory variables also fail to
reveal a settlement class effect.
Soft Relief. The presence of "soft" relief (such as coupons) when this was
valued as part of the common fund is not statistically significant. Even
though we distinguished between included and nonincluded soft relief, we
find no robust soft relief effects.
Federal Versus State Courts. We predicted that fees as a percent of the recov-
ery would be higher in state court class actions than in federal courts. This
prediction is not confirmed by the evidence. If anything, the opposite is true.
In two of the non-fee-shifting case models, being in federal court is signi-
ficantly associated with higher fee levels and percents than is being in state
court. In the other two models, the coefficient on the federal court dummy
variable is also positive, although not significant. It might be supposed that
this result is due to the impact of securities cases, almost all of which are in
federal court and tend to generate fee percents above the norms for fee per-
centages across the universe of cases. In fact, however, the fee percents in
nonsecurities cases are also higher in federal court than in state court (about
20 percent compared to 19 percent in nonsecurities, non-fee-shifting cases
and 38 percent compared to 32 percent in fee-shifting cases).
Time Trend. The coefficient on the 'Year" variable in Table 4 indicates that,
in most models, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no linear time trend in
either fee levels or fee percents. This result holds for both the published
opinion data and the CAR data and is consistent with Figure 1. Model 3 is
the only model with a significant and positive year effect. But this is for the
subset of the data consisting of cases with a computable lodestar. A model
using the subset of the data consisting of cases without a computable lodestar
produces a negative coefficient for the year variable. We thus find no robust
evidence of an increasing time trend in fees.
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C. Securities Cases
Table 4's regression models provide ambiguous guidance with respect to the
relation between fees and case categories. As the note accompanying the
table reports, a set of case category dummy variables is not significant in
the published opinion data but is highly significant in the CAR data. To
further explore fees in homogeneous categories, we separately analyze the
published opinion non-fee-shifting cases by dividing the sample into securi-
ties cases and nonsecurities cases. The CAR data include only common fund
cases and therefore have no fee-shifting cases. A further benefit of explor-
ing securities cases separately is that it allows us to test the effect of the
PSLRA on attorney fees.
A few adjustments to Table 4's models are necessary. First, for securi-
ties cases, we eliminated the federal case dummy variable. Over 98 percent
of securities class actions we found were in federal court, so the federal case
dummy would provide no information of value. Second, we introduced a
post-PSLRA dummy variable to divide the sample into cases subject to the
PSLRA and cases that preceded it. We treated a case as subject to the PSLRA
if it was decided after the PSLRA and had an age in years that assured it
commenced after the PSLRA's effective date. We treated a case as not subject
to the PSLRA if (1) it was decided before 1996, or (2) it was decided after
1995 and had an age in years that indicated it commenced before the
PSLRA's effective date. Cases that could not be unambiguously determined
to be subject to or not subject to the PSLRA were dropped. Table 5 reports
the results.
Table 5 suggests that the key results in Table 3 are not a consequence
of combining the large group of securities cases with other class action cases.
The key relations between fee size and client recovery, and fee percent and
client recovery, remain intact. The effects of the defendant paying the fee
and risk and the higher fees in federal court are also consistent with Table
4's results.
The new variable introduced in Table 5, the PSLRA dummy variable,
provides ambiguous guidance. It is positive and significant in the published
opinion securities case data, suggesting that fees in securities cases after the
PSLRA increased both in level and percent-a result that was probably not
intended by the drafters of the PSLRA, which is widely viewed as a statute
intended to rein in the activities and profitability of securities class action
attorneys. But the same variable is negative and insignificant in the CAR data
models. The one unambiguous result is the absence of significant evidence
that the PSLRA reduced fee awards in securities cases.
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Table 5: Analysis of Securities Cases and Nonsecurities Non-Fee-Shifting
Cases
1 2 3 4 5 6
Securities Cases Nonsecurities Cases CAR Securities Cases
Fee Fee Fee Fee Fee Fee
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
Gross recovery 0.854** -0.661** 0.832** -0.757** 0.916** -0.444**
(log) (26.00) (4.76) (37.61) (8.85) (53.43) (5.31)
Lodestar -0.064+ -0.353* -0.005 -0.032 -0.048** -0.227**
dummy (1.80) (2.21) (0.10) (0.20) (3.16) (3.04)
Post-PSLRA 0.089* 0.465** -0.000 -0.011 -0.066
dummy (2.60) (2.81) (0.01) (0.72) (0.93)
Defendant pays -0.581** -2.308** -0.196** -0.718**
(4.69) (4.35) (2.87) (3.35)
Age (log years) 0.029 0.132 0.077* 0.325* 0.039* 0.233**
(0.78) (0.87) (2.05) (2.35) (2.35) (2.91)
Appellate -0.063 -0.120 -0.012 -0.115
opinion (0.67) (0.27) (0.20) (0.52)
Multiplier (log) 0.045 0.112 -0.059 -0.172 -0.030 -0.107
(1.26) (0.73) (1.51) (1.22) (0.79) (0.58)
High-risk case 0.100"* 0.476** 0.103+ 0.521*
dummy (2.76) (2.91) (1.90) (2.47)
Low-risk case -0.182** -0.768** -0.095 -0.411+
dummy (3.26) (3.39) (1.53) (1.79)
Objector -0.045 -0.106 -0.013 -0.053
dummy (1.07) (0.52) (0.27) (0.29)
Nonincluded 0.021 0.044 -0.000 -0.234
soft relief (0.42) (0.19) (0.00) (1.16)
Included soft -0.150 -0.213 0.011 0.054
relief (0.71) (0.31) (0.17) (0.21)
Settlement -0.073* -0.337+ 0.014 0.035
class (2.07) (1.89) (0.28) (0.19)
Federal case 0.153* 0.599**
dummy (2.38) (2.90)
Constant 0.387+ 9.530** 0.312* 9.283** -0.013 8.168**
(1.71) (9.88) (2.04) (15.77) (0.11) (14.57)
Observations 119 119 139 154 436 436
Adj. 2  0.94 0.46 0.91 0.49 0.94 0.16
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
+ significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.
NOTE: Dependent variables are fee percent, transformed to square roots, and fee amount,
transformed to logs. For the published opinion data, the sample includes only non-fee-shifting
cases. Variables not in the CAR models are not readily available in the CAR data.
SOURCES: Reported class actions with fee awards, 1993-2002; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
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Another difference between the published opinion data and the CAR
data is worth noting. The sign of the gross recovery coefficient is negative
in fee percent Models 2 and 6. But the CAR data show significantly less of a
scale effect. Although fee percent decreases with increasing size of class
recovery in both, the rate of decrease is lower in the CAR data. The princi-
pal difference between the CAR data and the published opinion data is that
the CAR data include substantial numbers of unpublished opinions. Courts
may be discounting percentage fees to account for size of recoveries more
in published opinions than in nonpublished ones. We offer two possible
reasons for this result. First, when courts give an extremely generous fee (a
high percentage for a large recovery), they may not want to advertise this
fact for fear of being criticized, or out of concern that the decision might
stand as an undesirable precedent for future cases where generous fees are
not warranted. Second, the sources that yield the CAR data may tend to over-
report high percentage awards relative to low percentage awards. Although
CAR does not filter data,55 it does solicit submissions of case information.5 6
Attorneys might naturally tend to submit information about their highest
percentage awards. In the context of jury verdict reports, such solicitation
methodology has led to upwardly biased estimates of award amounts.57
D. Costs and Expenses
We also examined costs and expenses of litigation. For non-fee-shifting cases,
we had usable costs and expenses and recovery data for 232 cases. For fee-
shifting cases, we had usable data for 43 cases. Costs and expenses for the
sample as a whole were, on average, 4 percent of the relief for the class and
16 percent of the fee. Table 6, Panels A and B, break these figures down by
legal regime and case category. Table 6, Panel C shows similar figures for
the CAR data. The median values were, respectively, 2.3 percent and 10.5
percent in our opinion data and 3.1 percent and 11.3 percent, respectively,
in the CAR data. Costs and expenses also varied across case type and legal
regime, as shown in Table 6, Panel A. The highest median costs in a case
category with at least 10 cases were 5.9 percent in consumer fee-shifting
524 Class Action Rep. at 168.
'1d. at first page, unnumbered.
57Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T. Wells,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 747 (2002).
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Table 6: Costs and Expenses by Legal Regime and Case Category
Non-Fee-Shifting Cases Fee-Shifting Cases
Category Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N
A. Costs as Percent of Recovery
Antitrust 2.7
Civil rights 8.4
Consumer 4.6
Corporate 2.2
Employment 2.9
ERISA 3.9
Mass tort 3.7
Securities 3.9
Tax refund 0.0
Tort 2.9
Other 2.1
Total 3.7
2.6 30 -
7.2 2 4.9
9.6 35 8.0
2.2 8 -
3.0 4 5.3
2.5 3 3.1
3.9 3 -
3.5 125 -
- I -
3.6 10 -
1.3 11 1.6
4.8 232 5.4
4.0 4
6.6 14
7.4 12
2.7 11
0.3 2
5.9 43
19.4 8
19.3 15
14.8 12
10.6 11
2.9 4
15.8 50
B. Costs as Percent of Fee Award
Antitrust 15.9 10.0 20.8 31 -
Civil rights 19.6 12.7 15.6 3 22.2
Consumer 26.8 4.7 53.8 38 16.8
Corporate 7.5 7.5 4.8 11 -
Employment 11.6 10.4 11.3 4 14.7
ERISA 14.4 16.6 6.1 4 12.1
Mass tort 23.3 20.0 18.7 3 -
Securities 15.9 13.0 12.5 136 -
Tax refund 1.1 1.1 - I -
Tort 14.2 15.0 11.4 11 -
Other 7.0 7.0 4.0 12 5.9
Total 16.7 10.7 24.5 254 15.3
C. Class Action Reports Data (CAR), 1993-2002
Costs as Percent of Recovery Costs as Percent of Fee
Antitrust 2.8
Consumer 2.9
Civil rights 4.2
Derivative
Employment 3.3
Environmental 6.8
Government regulation 5.7
Labor/wage/pension 1.7
Mass tort 3.9
Securities 4.8
Taxpayer 0.0
Utilities 1.1
Social welfare/ 0.4
entitlements
Total
2.8 28 10.3
5.0 36 14.3
4.4 4 18.2
1.5 4.0 8 11.9
6.8 8.0 2 19.4
5.7 - 1 19.3
0.9 1.7 28 7.8
3.4 3.4 8 21.2
3.6 4.3 461 17.9
0.0 - 1 1.1
1.1 0.4 2 5.4
0.4 - 1 2.9
4.4 3.1 4.3 580 16.7
7.7 10.1 28
4.1 26.3 36
17.6 12.6 4
6.5 11.3 8
19.4 21.2 2
19.3 - 1
5.3 6.8 28
15.0 17.6 8
12.4 28.0 461
1.1 - 1
5.4 2.5 2
2.9 - 1
11.3 26.2 580
SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards; 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
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cases. For case categories with data available for more than 10 cases, Panel
B shows that securities cases had the highest median costs as a percent of
the fee, 13.0 percent.
A regression model, not reported here, of costs as a percent of recov-
ery controls for case category and other factors used in Table 4. The model
shows that costs, like fees, have a scale effect: their percent of recovery sig-
nificantly declines as the size of the recovery increases, a result confirmed
in the CAR data. The cost percent significantly increases with a case's age,
also confirmed by the CAR data, and tends to be significantly higher in
fee-shifting cases than in non-fee-shifting cases. We find no evidence in our
data or the CAR data that the cost percent is increasing over time.
V. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION-A LOOKUP TABLE TO
CHECK ON FEE AWARDS
Our study provides information that may be useful to courts in evaluating
requests for attorney fees, costs, and expenses in class action cases. Most
simply, because our study finds an overwhelming correlation between class
recovery and attorney fees, the court can conduct a simple initial inquiry
that looks only at these two variables in any case where the size of class recov-
ery can be estimated. The court need only compare the request in a given
case with average awards in cases of similar magnitude. If the request is rel-
atively close to average awards in cases with similar characteristics, the court
may feel a degree of confidence in approving the award. If the request is sig-
nificantly higher than amounts awarded in past cases, the court should
inquire further. The methodology is more appropriate for non-fee-shifting
cases in which, as Table 1 shows, the range of fee-award percents is less vari-
able than in fee-shifting cases. Accordingly, we use only non-fee-shifting cases
in the following analysis.
To provide numerical guidance, we divide the client recoveries in our
published opinion data by decile, thus assigning approximately ten percent
of the cases to one of ten ordered groups. For each client recovery decile,
we compute the mean and median fee percents, and the standard deviation,
for the published opinion data set. Since the deciles each contain an approx-
imately equal number of cases, each fee percent computation is based on
similarly sized samples. Table 7, Panel A, reports the results.
The table's first column identifies each decile. The second column
shows the range of client recovery for the decile-for example, less than $1.4
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Table 7: Fee Percent at Deciles of Client Recoveries
Recovery Mean
Client Range Recovery in
Recovery in Decile Decile Mean Fee Median Fee
Decile ($ Millions) ($ Millions) Percent Percent SD Fee Percent
A. Published Opinion Data
Less than 10% <1.4 0.8 29.5 30.0 5.9
10 to 20% 1.4 to 3.1 2.3 26.5 25.0 10.9
20 to 30% 3.1 to 5.2 4.3 25.0 29.4 7.9
30 to 40% 5.2 to 9.7 7.2 25.6 26.0 7.0
40 to 50% 9.7 to 15 12.0 22.7 22.4 8.4
50 to 60% 15 to 22 18.8 22.0 24.5 8.6
60 to 70% 22 to 38 30.4 19.0 19.0 9.9
70 to 80% 38 to 79 53.7 16.9 15.5 10.2
80 to 90% 79 to 190 122.2 17.6 15.0 9.2
Greater than 90% >190 929.1 12.0 10.1 8.1
B. Class Action Reports Data (CAR)
All Cases Nonsecurities Cases
Recovery Mean
Client Range in Recovery Mean Median Mean Median
Recovery Decile in Decile Fee Fee SD Fee Fee Fee SD Fee
Decile ($ Millions) ($ Millions) Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Less than <1.4 0.8 30.0 30.0 9.9 30.9 33.2 8.2
10%
10 to 20% 1.4 to 3.1 2.3 29.2 30.0 5.4 25.6 25.0 6.9
20 to 30% 3.1 to 5.2 4.3 28.9 30.0 6.1 26.5 26.4 7.9
30 to 40% 5.2 to 9.7 7.2 28.7 30.0 5.3 28.9 29.6 5.1
40 to 50% 9.7 to 15 12.0 28.0 30.0 6.1 27.3 25.0 5.2
50 to 60% 15 to 22 18.8 26.7 28.0 7.8 26.6 30.0 7.9
60 to 70% 22 to 38 30.4 24.8 25.0 9.7 22.1 23.4 10.1
70 to 80% 38 to 79 53.7 24.3 25.4 8.5 23.9 25.5 9.0
80 to 90% 79 to 190 122.2 20.3 20.8 7.5 19.5 20.2 8.3
Greater <190 929.1 16.4 17.6 9.6 17.6 16.4 10.6
than 90%
NOTE: Client recovery amounts are in millions of inflation-adjusted $ 2002. Client recovery
ranges and deciles in the second and third columns of both panels are computed using the
published opinion data. The CAR data show the median fee percent award in the CAR data for
the recovery range shown in the second column.
SOURCES: Reported class action settlements with fee awards, 24 Class Action Rep. 169.
million in the first decile. The next column shows the mean client recovery
within the decile. For example, in the 30 to 40 percent decile, the mean
client recovery was $7.2 million (with a range of $5.2 to $9.7 million). In
Panel A, the next three columns show the summary statistics for the fee
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percent within each decile. Panel B shows the summary statistics for the CAR
data in the same range of client recovery. Because the CAR data are so dom-
inated by securities cases, we report separately the fee percent for all CAR
cases and for CAR nonsecurities cases alone.
With respect to fee percents, Table 7 shows, for example, that the mean
fee percent in the lowest decile in the decided cases data was 29.5, the
median was 30.0, and the standard deviation was 5.9. In that same range of
client recovery, the median fee award in the CAR data was 30.0 percent for
all cases and 33.2 percent for nonsecurities cases. In the highest decile of
recovery, the mean client recovery was $929,100,000 in the decided cases
data. The mean fee percent was 12.0 percent, with a median of 10.1 percent,
and a standard deviation of 8.1 percent. In that range of client recovery, the
median fee award in the CAR data was 17.6 percent for all cases and 16.4
percent for nonsecurities cases. Clearly, a substantial scaling effect is at work
but, as discussed above, it is less strong in the CAR data than in the pub-
lished opinion data.
Figure 8 illustrates the effect graphically. It differs from Table 7 in that
we allow the CAR data to "speak for itself' by using the client recovery deciles
as generated by its data. Both portions of Figure 8 show a scaling effect but
it is less extreme in the CAR data.
Approximately 68 percent of the cases in each decile range are pre-
dicted to fall within one standard deviation of the predicted fee, and 95
percent of the cases are predicted to fall within two standard deviations of
the predicted fee. The standard deviations are reported in Table 7, and illus-
trated in Figure 8.
Our suggestion is that fee requests falling within one standard devia-
tion above or below the mean should be viewed as generally reasonable and
approved by the court unless reasons are shown to question the fee. Fee
requests falling within one and two standard deviations above or below the
mean should be viewed as potentially reasonable but in need of affirmative
justification. Fee requests falling more than two standard deviations above
or below the mean should be viewed as presumptively unreasonable; attor-
neys seeking fees above this amount should be required to come forward
with compelling reasons to support their request. This methodology assumes
that judges render, on average across many cases, reasonably fair and effi-
cient awards. If judges have not achieved these normative goals in existing
awards, then their use as guidelines should be further tempered.
To illustrate how a court could use this information, suppose class
counsel requests a fee of $7.5 million, equal to 25 percent of a recovery of
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Figure 8: Fee percent range (one standard deviation) at levels of client
recovery.
Reported Decision Data
<1.4 1.4-3.1 3.1-5.2 5.2-9.7 9.7-15 15-22 22-38 38-79 79-190 >190
Client recovery range (millions $ 2002)
CAR Data
0
I I I I I I I0
<1.3 1.3-2.2 2.2-3.3 3.3-5.2. -7.2 7.2-11.1 11.116.7 16.732.9 32.9-84.0 >84.0
Client recovery range (millions $ 2002)
- Mean + 1 s.d./Mean - 1 s.d. Mean fee { i{ {
$30 million. At $30 million for the class, the mean fee in the published cases
data set is 19.0 percent or $5.7 million. The question is whether the
requested fee would be in the range of reason. At the $30 million recovery
level, the one-standard-deviation range of fee percents is 9.9 percent, yield-
ing a high end fee of 28.9 percent. The 28.9 percent figure corresponds to
$8.67 million of a $30 million recovery. So a $7.5 million fee, equal to 25
percent of the recovery, is within one standard deviation of the mean fee at
this client-recovery level. Thus the requested fee falls within the range of
reasonableness and the court should approve it unless the court has infor-
mation leading it to question such an award. On the other hand, suppose
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counsel requests a fee of $10 million or 33.3 percent of a $30 million award.
This request is more than one standard deviation above the mean of $5.7
million and therefore should not be approved unless further evidence jus-
tifies the award. But neither should the court automatically disapprove such
a fee, because it is well within two standard deviations of the mean at this
recovery level (38.8 percent or $11.64 million). Finally, suppose counsel
requested a fee of 40 percent, or $12 million. Because this is more than two
standard deviations above the mean award at this recovery level, the court
should presumptively disapprove the request unless powerful reasons justify
approval.
In evaluating the fee according to this methodology, the court could
appropriately take into account factors identified in this study as influenc-
ing the amount of the fee other than the gross recovery for the class. For
example, case type might be considered. Table 1 shows that consumer class
actions tend to generate lower fee percents than securities class actions. But
case type should not receive too prominent a role. Table 4's reported
opinion regression models do not permit rejection of the hypothesis that
case categories, as a group, have no significant effect on fee recovery. If the
case presents a higher-than-average risk profile, the court might well con-
sider this a factor that could justify a higher-than-normal fee. Conversely, if
the case is deemed low risk, this could be a factor yielding a reduced fee.
Since, as Table 4 shows, the lodestar multiplier has no observable effect on
fees in the published opinion data when one controls for client recovery and
other variables, courts may appropriately give this factor less importance
than the rhetoric of many cases suggests. In light of the substantial practical
problems with calculating the lodestar, courts may even elect to dispense
with this analysis altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study provides information about attorney fees and expenses awarded
in both common fund and fee-shifting class action cases as well as in share-
holders derivative cases in which the amount of the recovery for the corpo-
ration can be calculated. The single most important factor determining the
fee is the size of the client's recovery. Non-fee-shifting and fee-shifting cases
have such distinct fee characteristics that analyzing them together is inap-
propriate for many purposes. As theory would predict, given the incentives
facing attorneys in fee-shifting cases, fees in these cases are significantly
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higher as a percent of class recovery than fees in non-fee-shifting common
fund cases.
58
Fee size also increases as cases are found in federal rather than state
court. The fee as a percent of client recovery is noticeably below the widely
quoted one-third level, ranging from about 30 percent in the smallest cases
down to about 10 percent in the largest cases in the published opinion data
set. Fee as a percent of recovery in the CAR data was also below the one-
third level, but was higher than in the published opinion data.
As theory also predicts, fees in fee-shifting cases display a markedly
wider variance, as a percent of recovery, than fees in common fund cases
(standard deviation of 25.0 percent for fee-shifting cases as compared with
9.9 percent for non-fee-shifting cases).
We find no robust evidence that attorney fees in common fund cases
have been increasing or decreasing over the 10-year period studied. Upward
time trend effects are not robust in models that include key variables. Nor
do we find evidence that the presence of an objector has an impact on the
fee, either up or down. Settlement classes were not robustly significantly
associated with fee levels. We find some evidence that complexity is corre-
lated with higher fees: age of the case was significant and positive for some
non-fee-shifting case models and the presence of an appellate opinion was
significant and positive for non-fee-shifting cases. However, the results on
complexity were ambiguous both because we used inexact proxies for this
variable (which is in itself poorly defined) and because we found no signif-
icance for appellate opinions in non-fee-shifting cases and a negative and
significant result for age in fee-shifting cases.
We find evidence that fees tend to be higher in federal court than in
state court in non-fee-shifting cases, and that, also in non-fee-shifting cases,
fees tend to be lower when the defendant pays the fee rather than when the
fee is taken out of the class recovery. The fact that the defendant pays the
fees in a non-fee-shifting case was highly significant in most models (beyond
the 0.01 level) and negative, suggesting that even when the money in some
sense comes out of the same "pot" (the defendant's bank account), the
defendant's commitment to pay the fees had a moderating effect on their
amount.
Risk is also usually significant: fees as a percentage of the recovery tend
to be higher in high-risk cases than in other cases, and lower in low-risk cases.
'Regression models not reported here strongly confirm this.
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As to soft relief, we find no evidence that either soft relief included in the
estimated benefit for the class, or soft relief that is not included in the
estimated benefit, affects the fee award, either up or down.
We find robust evidence of a scaling effect. The percent of the recov-
ery that goes to attorneys decreases as the size of the recovery increases, in
both the reported opinions and in the CAR data. This effect can be inter-
preted as supporting the underlying theory for class actions. As similar cases
are aggregated, the efficiency gains yield an increased net return to clients.
This economy of scale carries over to costs and expenses. Costs absorb a
lower percent of the recovery as the recovery increases. Costs also increase
with case complexity and are higher in fee-shifting cases.
Finally, we present a table that can guide courts in assessing the size of
the fees in class action cases. Given a level of client recovery, the table
provides evidence of the presumptively valid range of fees.
HeinOnline -- 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 78 2004
